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Abstract—In this paper we propose game theoretic Medium
Access Control (MAC) strategies for data dissemination scenar-
ios. In particular, we use energy-based utility functions that
inherently imply power-awareness, while we consider network
coding techniques to eliminate the necessity of exchanging ac-
knowledgement control packets. Simulation results show that our
proposed strategies enhance the energy efficiency of the system
and reduce the dissemination completion time compared to an
optimized standard protocol.
Index Terms—Medium Access Control (MAC); Nash Equilib-
rium; Network Coding; Energy Efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data dissemination concept attracts increasing attention,
since the spreading of digital information becomes of
paramount importance. Such information could be multimedia
files or continuous streaming segmented into packets to be
shared properly among the interested nodes. The problem
of data dissemination is harder and more complicated in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) due to the lack of any
infrastructure and the instability of wireless links. However,
network coding [1] has been recently introduced in order
to provide the communication with robustness, diversity and
enhanced Quality of Service (QoS).
Network coding has been proven to achieve the multicast
capacity [2], thus being potentially a beneficial application
for data dissemination. Furthermore, since data collection is
an equivalent situation to the coupon collector’s problem [3],
network coding can significantly simplify the complexity of
the solution [4]. Specifically, transmitting linear combinations
of the packets instead of just forwarding the information flows
eliminates the necessity of exchanging acknowledgements.
Hence, it is sufficient for a network node to receive enough
independent linear packet combinations in order to decode the
entire data set.
Recently, it has been shown that giving priority to the node
with the most information does not speed up the dissemination
process. Specifically, Lucani et al. [5] demonstrated that the
completion time is minimized by selecting the node with
the greatest impact1 in the network to transmit in each slot.
However, in their paper it is neither defined any realistic MAC
1Impact is defined as the number of innovative packets that are delivered
to the sink nodes in one transmission.
protocol nor specified which node transmits when more than
one node has the greatest impact in the network.
The work of [5] has motivated us to design medium access
strategies for data dissemination scenarios. Let us recall that
the upper goal of data dissemination is to share a number of
packets among a set of sink nodes. Specifically, the goal of
all nodes is twofold: i) to complete the dissemination in a
reasonable time and ii) to maximize their lifetime. Therefore,
during the dissemination process, the source nodes have to
balance a trade-off between transmitting data and saving
energy. This fact, along with the selfish nature of the nodes,
has inspired us to consider game theory [6] as an appropriate
tool in order to provide this problem with a reliable solution.
In this paper, we present energy efficient game theoretic
medium access strategies for data dissemination. We introduce
a Dissemination Access Game (DAG) to identify a state of
balance (equilibrium) of the network nodes between saving
energy and proceeding the dissemination procedure. The con-
tribution of our proposed scheme lies on the following:
1) We use energy-based game theoretic techniques to im-
prove the energy efficiency of the system without com-
promising the offered QoS.
2) We propose a general access scheme that can be applied
in several wireless Standards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the two versions of our proposed Dissemination
Access Game (simple access and delay-bounded access strat-
egy), along with the game theoretic framework of the problem.
The performance evaluation of our protocols is provided in
Section III, while Section IV concludes the paper.
II. PROPOSED MEDIUM ACCESS GAME FOR DATA
DISSEMINATION
A. System Model
We consider a network topology with a base station that
holds the total amount of information and a set of nodes
that desire the disseminating data. The dissemination takes
place in two phases: i) in the first phase the base station
broadcasts the information to the nodes that are placed inside
its transmission range, and ii) in the second phase the nodes
that have already received the information (so called source
nodes) are enabled to forward the data to the rest interested
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nodes (so called sink nodes). We focus on the second phase of
the problem, where we consider that there are two sources that
have already obtained the total amount of information and a
set of L sink nodes that are interested in the disseminating
data (Fig. 1). Furthermore, the transmission ranges of the
sources are partially overlapped, while both sources affect the
same number of sink nodes, thus having the same impact
in the network. We further assume a slotted system, where
the node with the maximum impact on the network gets
the access to the channel in order to transmit in each slot.
Apparently, the existence of more than one source in the
network generates conflicting situations that need to be solved
by specific medium access control mechanisms.
Regarding the data transmissions, random linear network
coding techniques are adopted to facilitate the data dissemina-
tion. In particular, the nodes transmit linear combinations of
the packets, thus eliminating the need of control packets (i.e.
acknowledgements). However, an extra overhead is added to
the packets, since the network coding header includes informa-
tion which is necessary for the decoding of the packets, such
as the coding vector, the generation size and the generation
identifier.
Fig. 1. System Model
B. Game Model
In order to focus on the energy aspect of the problem, we
choose the utility function such that to quantify the lifetime
of the nodes. Defining ETOTAL as the total energy amount
available to each node and E[E ] as the average amount of
energy that is consumed by the wireless interface in each
slot due to transmissions, the utility function of client i is
given by Ui = ETOTALE[Ei] . An ideal scenario would be a round
robin scheduling among the source nodes coordinated by a
central controller or explicit information exchange between
the nodes. However, this would induce more interference and
require extra energy consumption, while it is applicable only
in infrastructure networks.
Since the global goal is the completion of the dissemi-
nation, all nodes have profit of transmitting data. However,
the sender’s role implies energy wasting, hence no client
would take up this role, unless particular incentives would be
provided. On the other hand, if no one transmits, the nodes will
end up with spending all their energy in waiting. To analyze
this conflicting situation, we model the access scenario as a
static non-cooperative game with complete information, where
each node maximizes its own utility.
In order to be compatible with the notations of game theory,
let us start by generally denoting the set of the players3 as
N = {1, 2}. The action set includes two feasible actions,
i.e. A = {transmit(T ), wait(W )}. However, in order to
deal with mixed strategies, we define as actions the trans-
mit probabilities of the players, i.e. si = αi(T ),∀i ∈ N .
Therefore, the extended strategy space of player i is given by
Si = {si|0 ≤ si ≤ 1}. The strategy combination is denoted
as s = (s1, s2) ∈ S, where S is the Cartesian product of the
two players’ strategy spaces. Furthermore, we define as:
s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ...., sn) ∈ S−i (1)
the strategy combination of all players except i. Moreover, we
extend the definition of the utility function and we use Ui(s)
to denote the utility of player i when the strategy combination
is s. Finally, since we deal with mixed strategies, a strategy
combination s∗ is said to achieve the Nash Equilibrium Point
(NEP ) [7] when:
Ui(s∗) ≥ Ui(s∗−i, si),∀si ∈ Si, i ∈ N (2)
C. Dissemination Access Game
In the following subsections we introduce two versions of
our proposed Dissemination Access Game: i) a simple access
strategy, where the players estimate the NEP according to
energy-based utility functions and ii) a delay-bounded access
strategy, where the players act in a way similar to the simple
access scheme, while a central controller is occasionally used
to reduce for the completion time of the dissemination.
1) Simple Access Scheme: The straight-forward repre-
sentation of the game in its strategic form is presented
in Fig. 2. The set of the feasible pure actions is A =
{transmit(T ), wait(W )}, while the contents of the table are
energy costs that each node wishes to minimize.
Fig. 2. The cost matrix of the proposed game.
Three different cases derive from Fig. 2:
1) Both nodes transmit: The nodes waste energy for the
transmissions (ES), while the collision of the packets adds
3Note that the terms ”player”, ”node”, ”client” will be used interchangeably
in this paper.
an extra cost, ECOST , since the dissemination does not
proceed.
2) One node transmits - One node waits: The transmitting
node wastes energy for the transmission (ES), while
the backoff node has a zero-consumption since the data
dissemination proceeds normally.
3) Both nodes wait: The nodes do not spend energy on
transmissions but they do have an extra cost, EW , since
they expend energy while the dissemination does not
proceed.
Since there is no efficient equilibrium in pure strategies,
each node selects a transmit probability, si, independently of
the others. Therefore, the expected energy wasted for the two
nodes is given by3:
E[E1] = s1 · s¯2 · ES + s1 · s2 · (ES + ECOST ) + s¯1 · s¯2 · EW (3)
E[E2] = s2 · s¯1 · ES + s2 · s1 · (ES + ECOST ) + s¯2 · s¯1 · EW (4)
where the symmetry of the equations motivates us to search
for symmetrical strategies.
Furthermore, the indifference principle defines that the
mixed strategy NEP of a game can be simply computed by
making each player indifferent among his strategy choices and,
hence, we have to estimate the roots of the partial derivative of
the expected cost of player 1 with respect to s2, i.e.
∂E[E1]
∂s2
= 0.
For simplicity reasons and without loss of generality, let us
assume that EW = a · ES and ECOST = b · ES . Consequently:
ES · (a · (s1 − 1) + b · s1) = 0 =⇒ s1 = a
a+ b
(5)
Given that the power level of the idle state in IEEE 802.11
is the 70% of the transmission state [8], we set a = 0.7,
while we assume that b = 1. Fig. 3 shows a plot of client
1’s utility for various values of s2, using numerical values:
ETOTAL = 100J , ES = 9.5 · 10−4J , ECOST = 9.5 · 10−4J
and EW = 6.7 · 10−4J .
In this figure we can do the following observations:
• The maximum utility of node 1 increases with s2.
• For large values of s2, the optimal strategy for node 1 is
to wait.
• If node 1 transmits with s1 ' 0.412, its utility is
independent of node’s 2 strategy, s2. Since the game
is symmetric, the same holds for player 2. This value
verifies our analysis (Eq. (5)) for a = 0.7 and b = 1.
Hence, considering the symmetry of the game, we conclude
that the strategy s = (s1 ' 0.412, s2 ' 0.412) is the
NEP of our game, since any other strategy would violate
the indifference principle.
2) Delay-bounded Access Scheme: Applying the proposed
simple access scheme to the network, it is possible to have
unsuccessful/empty slots in the network either due to collisions
or idle slots when the nodes mutually transmit or wait,
respectively. Hence, in order to bound the time that is needed
to complete the data dissemination, we adopt the use of a
3We use the notation s¯i to denote the complementary probability of si, i.e.
s¯i = 1− si.
Fig. 3. Player 1’s Utility vs. s1
central controller that defines which node is going to transmit,
when we have two consecutive slots without any successful
transmission. However, it is worth noticing that the controller
only senses the channel and intervenes occasionally by polling
one station, hence eliminating the necessity of control packets
and extra overhead.
In this case, we have the following contingent before having
a successful transmission of a packet:
i) 1st slot: either successful or unsuccessful transmission.
ii) 2nd slot: unsuccessful transmission in the first slot fol-
lowed by either successful or unsuccessful transmission.
iii) 3rd slot: unsuccessful transmissions in the first two slots
and the central controller defines which node is going to
transmit.
Therefore, the expected energy cost for the node 1 is given
by:
E[E ′1] = [s1 · s¯2 · ES + s1 · s2 · (ES + ECOST ) + s¯1 · s¯2 · EW ]+
+ [s¯1 · s¯22 · s1 · ES + s¯1 · s¯2 · s1 · s2 · (ES + ECOST ) + s¯21 · s¯22 · EW
+ s21 · s2 · s¯2 · ES + s21 · s22 · (ES + ECOST ) + s1 · s2 · s¯1 · s¯2 · EW ]+
[s¯21 · s¯22 · ppoll · ES + s21 · s22 · ppoll · ES + 2 · s1 · s2 · s¯1 · s¯2 · ppoll · ES ]
(6)
where the three terms in brackets represent the expected value
of energy consumption with regard to the three aforementioned
cases, respectively. In order to search for equilibrium strate-
gies, let us assume again that EW = a·ES and ECOST = b·ES ,
while the probability ppoll is constant, due to the fairness of the
scheduler. Differentiating the utility function U ′1 =
ETOTAL
E[E′1]
with respect to s1 gives:
∂U ′1
∂s1
= −ETOTAL
(E[E ′1])2
· ∂(E[E
′
1])
∂s1
(7)
The best response of s1 to the strategy s2 is given by setting
∂U ′1
∂s1
= 0 or equivalently (from Eq. (7)) ∂(E[E
′
1])
∂s1
= 0. Therefore
s¯2 · b + 2 · s2 · b− s¯2 · a · b− s¯22 · s1 · b− s¯1 · s¯22 · b+
+ 2 · s¯1 · s¯2 · s2 · b− 2 · s¯1 · s¯22 · a · b + 6 · s1 · s22 · b+
+ s2 · s¯1 · s¯2 · a · b− s1 · s2 · s¯2 · a · b = 0
(8)
Figure 4 shows a plot of Eq. (8) when a = 0.7 and b = 1.
It can be observed that there is only one fixed-point solution
in the strategy space (s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1]), i.e. s∗1 = s∗2 ' 0.25,
which is the unique equilibrium of the game. In order to justify
this, we use the definition of the NEP . Specifically, since the
NEP is defined as the mutual best response, we conclude that
any fixed point in mixed strategies constitutes a NEP [9].
Fig. 4. s1 vs s2 and Fixed point solution
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have developed a time-driven C++ simulator that im-
plements the rules of the proposed DAG schemes and we
have carried out Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the
performance of the protocols. In this section, we present the
simulation set up along with the results of our experiments.
A. Simulation Scenario
The network under simulation consists of eight nodes in
total, where two of them have already obtained the total
amount of information broadcasted by the base station, while
the rest six are sink nodes (Fig. 5). During the dissemination,
the two source nodes have the same impact on the network,
since they affect the same number of sink nodes (four sink
nodes in the range of each source). Additionally, the nodes
are capable of performing network coding techniques to their
buffer packets before forwarding them. Hence, the necessity
of exchanging acknowledgements is eliminated, since it is
sufficient for each node to receive a specific number of
independent linear combined packets. In our simulations we
assume that the nodes need to obtain 192 linearly independent
packet combinations to extract the total information. The
coding of the packets is performed over a finite Galois Field
- GF (28), since it has been proven to be sufficient for linear
independence among the packets. The specific field implies
that the number of the encoding packets represents the number
of the bytes in the encoding vector. If we use one generation
of 192 packets, the extra overhead in each packet will be
192 bytes, which is huge especially for small size payloads.
Therefore, we have chosen to create 16 generations of 12
packets each, which results in a network coding header of
13 bytes in total (12 bytes for the encoding vector, 4 bits for
the generation size and 4 bits for the generation identifier).
Fig. 5. Simulation Scenario
The time slot has been selected equal to 20µsec according
to the IEEE 802.11g physical layer [10], while we consider
two different transmission rates with regard to the Signal-to-
Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) values: i) 54 Mb/s for
high SINR conditions and ii) 24 Mb/s for low SINR condi-
tions. Regarding the power, Ebert et al. [8] have measured
the power consumption of a wireless interface during the
transmission and reception phase. Based on their work, we
have chosen the following power levels for our scenarios:
PT = 1900mW (power consumed in Transmission Mode),
PR = PI = 1340mW (power consumed in Reception and
Idle Mode, respectively). The value of PT has been selected
as an average value of transmission consumed power, since it
varies according to the Radio Frequency (RF) power level.
In our experiments, we compare the proposed strategies with
a IEEE 802.11-like protocol, where the conflicts are resolved
by using backoff mechanisms. We call this scheme Backoff-
MAC (BO-MAC) and the main assumption is that each source
node maintains a Congestion Window (CW) equal to 32, which
doubles after collisions. However, BO-MAC achieves better
performance comparing to the legacy IEEE 802.11 Standard
since the Inter Frame Space (IFS) times are omitted, while
the backoff mechanisms are used only in particular cases,
i.e. when more than one node has the greatest impact in the
network.
B. Performance Results
Figure 6 depicts the completion time of the data dissemi-
nation under both the proposed game theoretic schemes and
the Backoff-MAC. The experiments have been conducted
considering packets of various lengths (100-1500 bytes) for
both low and high SINR conditions. First, we can see that
our strategies outperform BO-MAC in all cases. However,
it is worth noticing that game theoretic approaches achieve
better performance even for worse SINR conditions for small
data packets (<500 bytes). Furthermore, we observe that
applying the delay-bounded strategy we are able to reduce the
completion time up to 30% (packet length of 1500 bytes in
low SINR conditions) compared to the simple access strategy.
On the other hand, using high transmission data rates the
gain is less significant, while for small packets (<250 bytes)
the simple access scheme achieves better performance than
the delay-bounded access strategy. This can be explained by
the fact that the high transmission probabilities in the simple
access scheme lead to an increased number of collisions.
However, the small packet length implies small transmission
time and, therefore, the collisions do not significantly affect
the total completion time of the dissemination.
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Fig. 6. Data Dissemination Completion Time (Game Theoretic Strategies
vs. Backoff Strategy)
Figure 7 presents the simulation results with regard to the
energy efficiency [11] of both versions of the Dissemination
Access Game along with the Backoff-MAC. Several worth-
while observations are derived by this figure. First, although
the completion time increases by using packets of big size,
the energy efficient increases as well, since the amount of
data delivered is beneficial for the network. Second, using the
delay-bounded strategy in high SINR conditions, we have a
great enhancement up to 100% compared to the BO-MAC
scheme. In general, the two game theoretic schemes are
proven to be more energy efficient than the optimized 802.11-
like protocol. However, in the low SINR scenario, BO-MAC
slightly outperforms the simple access strategy for packets of
1500 bytes. This is the only case where it is more efficient
to resolve the conflicts using congestion windows instead of
applying game theoretic techniques. Nevertheless, in this case
the delay-bounded strategy could provide an enhancement up
to 50% in terms of energy efficiency comparing to the other
two methods.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we proposed two game theoretic medium
access strategies for data dissemination scenarios. Compared
to an optimized IEEE 802.11-like scheme (BO-MAC), our
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Fig. 7. Energy Efficiency (DAG Schemes vs. Backoff-MAC)
approaches achieved up to 100% enhancement in energy
efficiency of the system, without degrading the offered Quality
of Service. In our future work we are planning to elaborate on
conflicts between more than two players in order to generalize
our schemes, while we aim at the validation of our results by
using analytical tools and methods.
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